

JPRS-TAC-88-011

8 April 1988



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CONTENTS

8 APRIL 1988

CHINA

START Issue in U.S.-Soviet March Talks Viewed [Radio Beijing in Russian, 21 Mar 88] 1

EAST EUROPE

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CSCE Delegate Dolezel Comments on Jakes Plan [Jozef Janto; Prague RUDE PRAVO, 26 Mar 88]	2
CSCE Delegate on Conventional Disarmament Prospects [East Berlin ADN International Service, 25 Mar 88]	2
Official Addresses USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on INF Treaty [East Berlin ADN International Service, 24 Mar 88]	2

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Commentary Backs Soviet Proposal to Freeze Mediterranean Naval Arms [East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 23 Mar 88]	3
Trade Unions Chief Speaks on Turnover of Soviet Missile Base [East Berlin ADN International Service, 24 Mar 88]	3

HUNGARY

CSCE Envoy Assesses Fifth Round [Budapest MTI, 25 Mar 88]	4
---	---

POLAND

CSCE Delegate Konarski Assesses Fifth Round [Franciszek Malinowski; Warsaw PAP, 27 Mar 88]	4
---	---

ROMANIA

Envoy Addresses CD Plenary Session in Geneva [Bucharest AGERPRES, 10 Mar 88]	4
--	---

YUGOSLAVIA

CSCE Delegate Outlines NNA Compromise Security Plan [Belgrade TANJUG, 24 Mar 88]	5
CSCE Envoy Golob Proposes Stockholm Conference Continue [Belgrade TANJUG, 25 Mar 88]	5

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

INDIA

Concern Over Threat From Ocean-Based Nuclear Weapons Expressed [Subrata Banerjee; New Delhi PATRIOT, Part I, 4 Feb; Part II, 5 Feb 88]	7
First Test of U.S. 'Alpha' Laser Noted [V. Linnik; Moscow PRAVDA, 6 Jan 88]	9

SOVIET UNION

'Bourgeois' Scholars' Views of Asia-Pacific Security Critiqued [V.F. Pryakhin; Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, Sep-Oct 87]	10
SPD's Vogel Wants FRG Position on Lance Missile Replacement Defined [Hamburg ARD Television Network, 28 Mar 88]	17

WEST EUROPE

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SPD Chairman Vogel's Washington Talks Viewed
[Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 26 Mar 88] 18

START Issue in U.S.-Soviet March Talks Viewed
*11231107 Radio Beijing in Russian to the USSR
1800 GMT 21 Mar 88*

[From the "Review of International Events" program]

[Excerpts] Here is a review from our Washington correspondent on difficult questions facing the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and the United States:

For the second time this year talks between the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and the United States will be held in Washington, 20-23 March, to prepare for the Moscow summit meeting between the two countries. It has become known that the issue of a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear arms and the Afghanistan question are occupying an important place at the talks.

After the signing of the INF treaty in Washington last December, both the Soviet Union and the United States view a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear arms as the main aim of the next step in arms control. Both have repeatedly expressed the hope that agreement will be reached before the summit meeting between the two countries that will be held this spring in Moscow.

However, no significant progress on this issue has yet been achieved between the two sides. Chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Nunn, said that at present there are three obstacles to reducing strategic nuclear arms between the United States and the Soviet

Union. These are the verification conditions, the link between sea-launched cruise missiles and the ABM treaty, and what amounts to a link between reductions and SDI.

Most observers consider that the issue of a link with the ABM treaty serves as a precondition for achieving an agreement on a reduction of strategic nuclear arms. However, a big rift exists between the Soviet and U.S. positions on this question. Gorbachev said on 11 March that the Soviet Union insists that an agreement on reducing strategic nuclear arms must be linked with a strict adherence to the 1972 ABM Treaty. Violation of this principle would undermine the mechanism of the agreement in general. Reagan, on the other hand, at a seminar held 14 March on the fifth anniversary of SDI—apparently referring to Gorbachev's statement—noted unequivocally that the United States would never allow SDI to become a bargaining chip at the talks.

It is possible that other questions will also be discussed during the Washington meeting between the USSR and U.S. foreign ministers. But the most topical questions are the issue of a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear arms and the Afghan issue. The results of talks on these questions will undoubtedly have an important bearing on the atmosphere of the summit meeting between the two countries in May. Observers still find it difficult to give an optimistic assessment as to whether or not the two foreign ministers will be able to find a way to solve these differences.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CSCE Delegate Dolezel Comments on Jakes Plan

AU281322 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
26 Mar 88 pp 1,7

[Jozef Janto, Vienna dispatch: "Another Round of Vienna Negotiations Concluded; Partial Results." Passage in boldface as published]

[Excerpts] Vienna (By our reporter)—The fifth round of the CSCE follow-up meeting was concluded in Vienna on Thursday [25 March]. The CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna opened as far back as November 1986, and was originally to have ended in November 1987.

Nevertheless, the slow rate of work on the final document (which will include military security, economic, ecological, and humanitarian issues) does not permit us even now to forecast when the Vienna meeting will end. The next (sixth) round will begin the middle of next month, and should be the decisive round. [passage omitted]

I have asked Frantisek Dolezel, head of the Czechoslovak delegation to the follow-up meeting in Vienna, how the initiative of Milos Jakes, CPCZ Central Committee general secretary, on creating a zone of confidence, cooperation, and good-neighborly relations along the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO fits into the efforts made within the framework of the pan-European process.

"This new, highly topical Czechoslovak initiative on basic issues takes the same direction as the entire Helsinki process. That is why it encounters the interest of representatives from the participating countries, both at the follow-up meeting in Vienna, and at the consultations of 23 states. Our partners particularly appreciate its comprehensive nature and the fact that it also concerns economic, ecological, and humanitarian issues, and not merely the military issues."

CSCE Delegate on Conventional Disarmament

Prospects
LD252023 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1554 GMT 25 Mar 88

[Text] Vienna, 25 Mar (ADN)—Ambassador Peter Steglich, GDR delegation leader at the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting, today described the recently agreed-on texts for a concluding document to the conference as positive and urgently needed steps. These steps are needed to be able to begin the final phase of editorial work. At the last plenary session of the meeting before the Easter holiday, he stated that the outlines of what is possible as a result of the Vienna meeting are becoming increasingly clear. At the same time, however, it must be stated that what has been achieved to date in editorial work remains well below expectations. What has proved to be the main obstacle to more speedy progress has been

the constant attempts by certain Western delegations to torpedo the necessary balancing of interests by one-sidedness in dealing with important problems and insistence on maximum demands.

With several examples Ambassador Steglich pointed out to the session that it is possible and necessary to open up further spheres of agreement in the negotiations. Thus, chances for an expanded and qualitatively new stage of cooperation among the CSCE participant states, with the aim of military detente in Europe, have recently become clearer. The progress achieved in the talks on a mandate for negotiations on conventional disarmament and a rapprochement of viewpoints on further negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures are proof of this. Nevertheless, even more difficult problems remain to be solved, such as the issue of which arms systems should be included in the negotiations on conventional disarmament. The speedy and final agreement on the political framework of these conferences and their start this year are of crucial importance.

Thus the Vienna follow-up meeting will be fulfilling one of its fundamental tasks in opening up the path toward progress on disarmament in the conventional sphere. Ambassador Steglich stressed that a step forward has been taken at the Vienna meeting, primarily by means of the initiative of the Warsaw Pact states. Thus the socialist states have moved considerably toward their Western partners in the military negotiations. At their instigation more substantial elements in the spheres of information, culture, education, and humanitarian cooperation have been agreed.

The key to the success of the Vienna meeting, the GDR diplomat concluded by stressing, is the readiness and willingness of all 35 states for reasonable compromise, taking into account what is viable.

Official Addresses USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on INF Treaty

LD241358 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1155 GMT 24 Mar 88

[Excerpt] Moscow, 24 Mar (ADN)—The Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet for examining the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles today continued its debate. The GDR viewpoint on the agreement was presented by Professor Wolfgang Weichert, chairman of the Constitution and Law Committee of the GDR People's Chamber. The GDR, he stated, has largely completed all preparations dependent on it in order to realize the conditions of the Soviet-U.S. treaty that concern its territory. It is ready to actively support all inspection procedures necessary in accordance with the treaty on its territory.

Prof Weichert recalled the fact that important practical steps have been undertaken by the USSR, the GDR, and the CSSR in order to promote the ratification process. The ahead-of-schedule withdrawal of the short-range

OTR-22 missiles from the GDR has been completed. There is deep symbolism in the fact that some of the military sites thus liberated are now to serve the recreation of the workers.

Prof Weichelt stated that the deputies of the GDR People's Chamber had the unambiguous mandate from the citizens to go on doing everything within their power in order that no hiatus might be permitted in the fight for disarmament and arms limitation. The GDR welcomes the efforts of the USSR and the United States to agree on a 50-percent reduction of their strategic offensive weapons while adhering to the ABM treaty, as well as to end nuclear weapons tests, at least gradually. In view of the threat to the GDR represented by tactical nuclear weapons systems with a range of less than 500 kilometers, the GDR supports dealing with the issues of tactical nuclear weapons in connection with issues of conventional armaments in Europe.

The chairman of the Constitution and Law Committee of the Peoples Chamber referred to the proposals of the GDR and the CSSR for the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe as well as a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in central Europe. Setting up nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world should also be promoted in the broadest way by means of the international meeting on this topic, invitations for which Erich Honecker has sent out for June this year in Berlin. The GDR representative thanked the USSR Supreme Soviet for its permission to take part in this meeting. [passage omitted]

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Commentary Backs Soviet Proposal to Freeze Mediterranean Naval Arms

AU241313 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 23 Mar 88 p 2

[“W.M.” commentary: “Constructive Proposals”] 

[Text] The narrow-minded and at the same time lustful lack of understanding of the Philistine in Faust's Easter Walk, who does not have anything better to do on Sundays and holidays than engage in talk about war and warmongering—“when far away, back there in Turkey the peoples are fighting each other”—is alien to the GDR people. We proceed from the premise that peace is indivisible. We advocate safeguarding peace—on our continent, in other parts of our planet, and all over the world. We know that regional conflicts threaten peace for all of us and that, conversely, progressive regional steps can serve the process of detente, help to solve global problems, and serve world peace. This is why we have made such proposals as the establishment of a nuclear-free corridor and a chemical-weapon-free zone in central Europe.

The same applies to the region “far away, back there in Turkey,” for the Mediterranean area with its European, Asian, and African coasts. The Soviet proposal to the United States announced by Mikhail Gorbachev in Belgrade last week is aimed at freezing as of 1 July the naval forces of the two states deployed in this region and at subsequently agreeing on upper limits for them. General confidence-building measures, timely notification of the movement of warships and on military maneuvers, including the invitation of observers, and the working out of principles and methods to guarantee the safety of intensively used navigation routes are further items of the USSR initiative.

We in the GDR support the Soviet proposal. We are guided by the knowledge that in the long run the political and military aspects of this area should not be excluded from the process of safeguarding peace in Europe. There is no doubt that this would also be in the interest of the non-European Mediterranean countries. The high concentration of fleets in this area immediately adjacent to Europe requires the expansion of the current confidence-building and security measures to the Mediterranean in the spirit of the Stockholm Document.

After the Soviet Union's Murmansk initiative last fall, which is aimed at improving the atmosphere in Europe's northern areas, corresponding proposals for the southern flank of our continent are now on the table. Once again it is becoming clear that socialism is doing everything possible to banish war and warmongering forever—in all regions and all over the world.

Trade Unions Chief Speaks on Turnover of Soviet Missile Base

LD241509 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1135 GMT 24 Mar 88

[Text] Berlin, 24 Mar (ADN)—Under socialism, disarmament directly brings about more social progress. This was stated by Harry Tisch, chairman of the National Executive Council of the FDGB, the GDR trade union federation, on Thursday when speaking to trade union officials in Kleinmachnow near Berlin. In this connection, he referred to the takeover of buildings, effective Wednesday, of a former missile base at Waren (GDR Bezirk of Neubrandenburg) for a holiday center for the FDGB, and assessed this event as a noteworthy example of resources liberated by means of disarmament being of benefit to people in socialist society. This accords with the guidelines laid down by the 11th SED Congress to continue policy for the wellbeing of the entire people and for peace in a consistent manner.

Harry Tisch stated that world politics have started to move as a result of the Washington agreement on nuclear disarmament. Proof was given that disarmament can be effected. This inspired millions of workers; and gave all

trade unionists confidence, strength, and new impetus to fight for good performance in socialist competition under the proven motto "my workplace—my battle station for peace."

HUNGARY

CSCE Envoy Assesses Fifth Round
LD252259 Budapest MTI in English
2119 GMT 25 Mar 88

[Excerpt] Budapest, March 25 (MTI)—The fifth round of the recently ended Vienna follow-up talks yielded results, which are modest but promising and carry the germs of a matterful agreement. This is now the work of the more than two month long conference period was evaluated by the head of the Hungarian delegation at the closing session on Friday.

The Hungarian speaker pointed out that in recent times several noteworthy steps were taken during the elaboration of the final document of the follow-up meeting. As is seen in the circles of the negotiations' participants the flexibility and openness improves. However, it should not be lost out of sight that the hard work comes now and further great efforts are needed.

He listed among the results of the round that the representatives of 23 Warsaw treaty and NATO countries at the same time with the follow-up meeting at their consultations in the Austrian capital accepted two new chapters to the mandates of the negotiations to be held on the reduction of the European armed forces and conventional weapons. As he told these texts carry a compromise of principles and meet the interests of all participants to the consultations and promote that the negotiations be started this year. A general understanding was reached that the so-called double purpose weapons—which could be used with both conventional and nuclear warheads—should not be left out from the issues of the European disarmament forum of the future, but it remains to be solved how the understanding could be expressed in the text of the mandate.

The ambassador declared: Hungary favourably accepted the Austrian initiative that the two planned European security forums: the talks on the armed force reduction and the new confidence building and disarmament conference be held also in Austria—Vienna or its vicinity.

Further on, he explained that regarding the parts of the final document dealing with the principles of the relations between the states, important problems still have to be solved, such as the mechanism of cooperation related to human rights, the role of individuals and organizations in the promotion of the Helsinki process, the situation of the national minorities. According to Hungary even in such sensitive issues satisfactory solutions could be found.

POLAND

CSCE Delegate Konarski Assesses Fifth Round
LD272030 Warsaw PAP in English
1647 GMT 27 Mar 88

[By PAP correspondent Franciszek Malinowski]

[Text] Vienna, March 27—Debates of the fifth round of the Vienna CSCE meeting ended here on March 25. On the occasion, head of the Polish delegation to the meeting Ambassador Włodzimierz Konarski gave the following statement to PAP:

"The Vienna meeting of representatives of 35 CSCE countries is in the final stage of its debates. About half of the final document has been squared. Chances for working out such a document increased as a result of the just ended round of negotiations. A rapprochement of views was achieved on issues dealing with military aspects of European security, and so was progress in humanitarian issues. Even so, difficult problems are still to be solved in the matter field.

"The Polish policy at the meeting aims at the acceleration of negotiations, their constructive course and search for reasonable solutions, acceptable to all participants.

"Realities of contemporary Europe are such that the controversial character of the debate is inevitable. It is important that the debate be effective and truly serve the concept of rapprochement. CSCE has already become an institution of permanent all-European dialogue and cooperation. Vienna debates are another chance for progress in factual Europeanization of relations among the 35 countries of the East and West," Konarski said.

ROMANIA

Envoy Addresses CD Plenary Session in Geneva
AU102038 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
2010 GMT 10 Mar 88

[Text] Geneva, AGERPRES, 10/3/1988—Speaking in the plenum of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, the Romanian representative stressed that in the current international situation which keeps serious and complex the halting of the arms race and a resolute passage to disarmament, to nuclear disarmament first and foremost, are fundamental problems. [sentence as received]

Though certain steps were taken toward solving problems through negotiations, no radical change has produced yet in the way of thinking and acting in the international life, the speaker showed. [sentence as received] That is why recently, through President Nicolae Ceausescu's voice, the Romanian people declared for intensified efforts toward concluding new accords on strategic nuclear arms reduction, the cessation of nuclear tests, renunciation of outer space militarization and complete elimination of nuclear weapons, calling upon

the United States and the other NATO countries as well as upon the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty countries to give up the manufacture and improvement of new nuclear weapons in Europe, to act so as to remove all suchlike arms from Europe and the world.

The Romanian representative proposed the setting up of a special committee of the conference apt to pass on to basic debates and the elaboration of the provisions of an international treaty on the total banning of nuclear tests on the basis of all the suggestions made during the proceedings.

He also proposed the creation of a special committee on negotiations which should examine and agree upon measures aiming at preventing any actions and programmes of arming in the space or its use for military purposes, the elaboration of regulations and measures apt to ensure its use for peaceful purposes alone, outside any arms race, the setting up within the UN of a special body both to control the observance of the accords on the non-militarization of space and to ensure its peaceful use.

YUGOSLAVIA

CSCE Delegate Outlines NNA Compromise Security Plan

*DL242310 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1957 GMT 24 Mar 88*

[("Pool" item)]

[Text] Vienna, March 24 (TANJUG)—A proposal on military aspects of European security which the neutral and non-aligned countries will submit at the Vienna C.S.C.E. (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) meeting tomorrow affirms the C.S.C.E. process as a common instrument of all 35 country-signatories of the Helsinki Act, Yugoslav delegation head Ambassador Ignac Golob stated today.

Golob will tomorrow present the proposal of Austria, Finland, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Malta, San Marino, Switzerland and Sweden at the plenary session tomorrow.

The neutral and non-aligned [N-N] countries have adopted a compromise solution so as to rally the participants of the Vienna meeting around it, the Yugoslav delegation head said.

The compromise solution lends support to the announced readiness of the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries to open talks on conventional disarmament but at the same time insists on the competence of all CSCE participating states for security in Europe. The upcoming arrangement of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty is provisional and must acknowledge the security interests of each of the 35 participating states, Golob set out.

Golob said that NATO, primarily the U.S., is investing efforts towards excluding the ? bloc [as received] countries' negotiations on disarmament in Europe from under the Vienna CSCE competence, which is in discrepancy with the already achieved consensus at the Madrid CSCE meeting.

Golob further said that Warsaw Treaty members have agreed that talks on conventional disarmament be restricted to the two military alliances, but urge firmer ties with the CSCE.

N-N countries propose that the Conference on Confidence-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe be convened at the earliest possible opportunity. Negotiations between the two blocs on conventional disarmament in Europe would be conducted parallelly, Golob said.

The N-N countries proposal envisages the establishment of CSCE mechanism for regular and comprehensive information and exchange of opinion of all 35 countries on the progress and results of inter-bloc negotiations on conventional disarmament. This would enable all CSCE participants to protect their interests and ensure that their stand is taken into consideration in the two blocs' negotiations [words indistinct countries], Golob said.

CSCE Envoy Golob Proposes Stockholm Conference Continue

*LD252035 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1900 GMT 25 Mar 88*

[Text] Vienna, March 25 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav delegation head, Ambassador Ignac Golob proposed on behalf of the neutral and non-aligned countries at today's plenary session that the Stockholm conference on measures of trust and disarmament be continued and within it the negotiations of 23 bloc countries.

Today's plenary session is the close of the fifth stage of the Vienna CSCE.

The group of N-N [neutral and non-aligned] countries requests that the negotiations be held within the Stockholm conference in order to preserve the integrity of the CSCE and the N-N countries' legitimate individual interests of security and defence.

Under the proposal, the functioning of the negotiations and their results would be discussed by the next CSCE meeting. The proposal envisages that Helsinki host the CSCE after Vienna.

In the meantime the 23 bloc countries would be obliged to regularly and in detail inform the conference on trust—continued Stockholm conference—, i.e. all 35 CSCE countries, on the negotiations.

The N-N countries announced that they were preparing joint proposals for all other open or disputed question in the closing document.

If no serious obstacles appear the Vienna CSCE could adopt a joint document in June or July this year.

INDIA

Concern Over Threat From Ocean-Based Nuclear Weapons Expressed

525000!5 New Delhi PATRIOT in English
Part I, 4 Feb 88; Part II, 5 Feb 88

[Article by Subrata Banerjee]

[Part I, 4 Feb 88, p 4]

[Text] The U.S.-Soviet agreement on the elimination of medium and short-range land-based nuclear weapons marks the first step in the long march towards nuclear disarmament. The attention of the people of the world is focused now on the next Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in Moscow to discuss the elimination of the long-range nuclear missiles.

It is in the context that one has to give thought to a long-neglected area of the struggle for nuclear disarmament. The nuclear threat is not from land alone. There are permanent sea-based nuclear weapons as well. In a sense one should include these weapons among the medium and short range ones. Submarines carrying nuclear weapons have great mobility and can move close to enemy territory and reach deep into the rear with missiles as quickly as the land-based medium range ones.

One cannot, in the circumstances, dismiss the danger of a build-up of sea-based nuclear arsenal to compensate for the reduction in land-based nuclear weapons. This would further accentuate the already existing danger of a nuclear war breaking out on the high seas. It has been seriously argued in NATO and U.S. circles that a nuclear war on the sea would cause far less civilian casualties.

The strategy is to deploy antisubmarine weapons to destroy all the enemy's submarine-based missiles and then threaten the vital centres from land, sea and air.

The naval threat has become a matter of concern, particularly for the developing countries and more so India. There is a regular presence of nuclear-weapon carrying navies of the big powers on the high seas. Naval manoeuvres are held regularly by the U.S. and NATO in waters close to the developing countries as also the Soviet Union.

In the nuclear-space age the navy has a major role to play in an aggressive military strategy. Ships armed with nuclear weapons and carrier-based aircraft provide speed and mobility not only in naval warfare but also in most vital supportive action in land operations as well. Nuclear-powered submarines can operate under water for much longer periods at a stretch.

Since the Second World War, the U.S. has extended its national security frontiers well beyond its geographical boundaries. The U.S. is consequently concerned about

its national security being threatened by local regional or internal conflicts in different parts of the world. In this extended approach the U.S. Navy has a very important role to play.

According to a report in the "Journal of the U.S. Institute of Defence Studies" (Vol. 128, No. 3/1983), President Reagan had said: "We must be able in times of emergency to venture in harm's way, controlling air, surface and sub-surface areas to assure access to all the oceans of the world."

Geographically the U.S. is more advantageously located in relation to the USSR to fulfil this task, because it has immediate access to both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The Soviet Union has direct access only to the Pacific, and that too through narrow straits usually controlled by the military allies of the U.S. Moreover the U.S. has at least 50 naval bases on foreign territory enabling its ships to cover the Soviet coastline. What is more, 55 percent of nuclear warheads targeted against the Soviet Union and the socialist countries are submarine-based.

While the geographical location is disadvantageous for the Soviet Union, its maritime needs are substantial. Forty-six percent of its exports and 70 percent of its imports are dependent on the sea route. About 400 Soviet mercantile vessels operate on international sea lanes. The Soviet mercantile fleet carries on an average over 230 million tonnes of cargo and 50 million passengers every year and its ships call on more than 120 foreign countries.

Although the U.S. claims that its naval presence in all the oceans of the world is necessary to protect its economic interests as the most powerful economic power in the world, it has less ships for non-military use than the Soviet Union. The overall displacement of the Soviet mercantile marine is 24.7 million tonnes and that of the U.S. only 19.5 million.

In the circumstances, particularly with the increasing U.S. naval presence and the refusal of the major capitalist powers to reduce this presence, the Soviet Union has every reason to be concerned and to exercise protection of its sea-shipping routes. This has become particularly important with the expanding economic relations of the Soviet Union with the developing countries. The economic compulsions for a stronger navy will assume greater importance for the Soviet Union as it enters the world economy in a much bigger way than now under the perestroika reforms.

In this context it is necessary to look at the increasing militarisation of the world oceans in the historical perspective. It was the emergence of mercantile capitalism that led to the importance of the military control of the sea trade routes in the 15th and 16th centuries. The

command of the oceans passed into the hands of the U.S. after World War II. The U.S. Navy had played a major offensive role in the Pacific.

With the beginning of the cold war, immediately after the Allied victory against German Nazism, and Japanese militarism, the role of the U.S. Navy underwent a qualitative change in keeping with the new military doctrine of the U.S., a doctrine that has undergone no change in four decades, as is evident from the statement of the U.S. Navy Secretary John Lehman: "Maritime strategy must isolate the Soviet continental power from the rest of the world, slowing down enemy forces, keeping pressure on the enemy's internal lines of communication."

It is to meet this threat that the Soviet Navy has developed over the years. It maintains a ballistic missile submarine fleet as a protection against the anti-submarine fleet of the Western powers and also to defend its coastline from carrier-based air attacks. Unlike the U.S. Navy, which prowls across all the oceans of the world, the Soviet Navy is seen mainly in the Gulf of Alaska, the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico and the North Atlantic.

[Part II, 5 Feb 88, p 4]

[Text] It is true that the Soviet Union has emerged as a naval power in recent years, but its strength, both in terms of numbers and weaponry, is nowhere near that of the United States, which, with 600 warships, is the largest naval power in the world. The navy is a major component in the U.S. military strategy and plays a positively aggressive role.

The Soviet Union does not conceive of the navy in a similar role. This is evident from the fact that it does not have large aircraft carriers. Against the 14 U.S. large deck ships, there are only two Kiev class carriers in the Soviet Navy which can take only helicopters and vertical take-off planes and not nuclear capable aircraft. They are very much like India's "Vikrant" and "Vikram."

In the process of acquisition of naval strength by the two great powers, the world now has some 15,000 nuclear weapons on the high seas, about 95 percent of them in the possession of the U.S. and the USSR.

The U.S. has on its 13 aircraft carriers more than 500 nuclear capable assault aircraft with an effective operational range of 1,300 kms. Over 100 of its surface ships and about 50 submarines are armed with Tomahawk Cruise missiles. These are low flying, high precision weapons, capable of hitting small size, well protected targets deep in the rear within a range of 2,600 kms. According to various experts, particularly the Centre for Defence Information, as on 1 April 1987, of the total number of U.S. strategic nuclear forces of 12,053, the number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles was 5,632; for the Soviet Union the corresponding figures were 10,364 and 2,648.

Every U.S. naval task force consists of one aircraft-carrier, with more than 100 aircraft and helicopters, six to eight large surface ships and one to two submarines. On the high seas such a group controls an area—and the skies above it—up to a radius of 600 nautical miles (1,100 kms) and in some regions up to 1,000 nautical miles. On the average, the task force can cover up to 700 nautical miles a day.

Since 1945, the U.S. has repeatedly employed its naval forces and carrier battle groups in the oceans round the developing countries—Vietnam, Bay of Bengal, the Gulf, Lebanese coast, Libya, Black Sea, Caribbean, Grenada, and now once more the Gulf. Admiral John Watkins admits that the "operating tempo" of the U.S. Navy is today "90 percent higher than during the Vietnam war." Lehman admits that the U.S. Navy is "spending more time on sea than it had averaged in World War II."

During 1981-85 more money has been budgeted for increasing the capability of the U.S. Navy than in all the years since World War II taken together. Since 1980 the stocks of armaments and hardware with the U.S. Navy are enough for a protracted war without replenishment for two months.

Attempts to curb a naval arms race have been going on since the years between the two world wars. In 1922, the U.S., Britain, France, Italy and Japan signed a treaty limiting their naval forces and weaponry. It was never ratified by France and Italy and Japan denounced it in 1934. In 1936 was signed the London Treaty by the five powers but never ratified. Fifty nations, including the USSR, signed a protocol restricting submarine action against civilian shipping in wartime. It is still in force.

The 38th U.N. General Assembly in December 1983 adopted a resolution on "Curbing the Naval Arms Race," calling for a reduction in naval armament and avoidance of naval build-ups far from a country's shores, particularly in tension-prone areas. The issue has been debated in subsequent sessions.

India and the Soviet Union have been active in the struggle for the reduction of naval armaments and their deployment. The Seventh Non-aligned Summit in New Delhi, in 1983, supported the Soviet proposal for negotiations among nuclear-weapons powers for the withdrawal of nuclear-capable ships from seas and creation of a zone of peace in the Mediterranean.

The Soviet Union has from the beginning supported the U.N. declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. It even conducted negotiations with the U.S. on the issue, until the latter called off the talks unilaterally. The U.S. has obstructed the convening of the U.N. Conference on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, despite the fact that the basic principles of the accord have already been drawn up.

In 1980 the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultation Council appealed for mutual limitation and reduction of military activities in the world oceans. Moscow has proposed a U.S.-Soviet Treaty banning anti-submarine

weapons in agreed zones as part of the 1972 ABM Treaty. What is of specific interest to India, however, is the CPSU General Secretary's call, in his speech at Vladivostok in July 1986, for the reduction of naval activity, "particularly nuclear armed ships," in the Asia-Pacific region and for the resumption of U.S.-Soviet talks on establishing the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

So far there has been no response from the U.S. One hopes that the ice having been broken with the INF Treaty between the Soviet Union and the U.S. efforts to make the oceans free of nuclear weapons will be taken up more vigorously. India is vitally interested in the removal of nuclear weapons from the oceans as part of the process of building a non-violent and nuclear-free world.

12913

'Bourgeois' Schelars' Views of Asia-Pacific Security Critiqued

18070047d Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No. 5, Sep-Oct 87 pp 31-40

[Article by V.F. Pryakhin, candidate of historical sciences and Soviet expert in the Worldwide Federation of Academic Workers: "Bourgeois Political Science and the Problems of Peace in the Asian-Pacific Region"]

[Text] The broad-scale comprehensive program to ensure peace, security and collaboration in the Asian-Pacific region advanced by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev on 28 Jul 86 in Vladivostok and substantiated by him during his official friendly visit to India in November 1986 presupposes the rejection of many traditional stereotypes of political thought.

Two opposing world views and two conceptions of international security are encountered in the approach to the problems of peace and security in the region. The Soviet concept is traditionally founded on the principle of the indivisibility of peace, the necessity of preserving and strengthening it, uniting the efforts of the states of all regions, both large and small countries, for these purposes based on the principle of a solitary security for all states. A specific plan for ensuring international security that was advanced by the Soviet Union as early as 1933 envisaged the conclusion of regional mutual-aid agreements; the draft of the Pacific Ocean Pact was proposed among these. Even at that time, Soviet diplomacy strove not only to ensure the effective defense of states from aggression, but to avert it as well, to prevent the appearance of seats of military conflict. As M.M. Litvinov emphasized, the value of the mutual-aid pacts proposed by the USSR consisted not so much in those real guarantees of military defense that they "sanctioned, as in the psychological impact they created during the period before the beginning of military action."¹ Even in our time, the Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that eliminating seats of military conflict and ensuring security in the region is a most important direction for the creation of an all-encompassing system of international security.²

The policy of ensuring a solitary security for all under conditions of an indivisible, mutually dependent and integral peace opposes the traditional course of bourgeois diplomacy of ensuring security by means of: a) a continuous increase in and qualitative improvement of military potential and the development of new military doctrines; and b) linking up in "winning" military and political coalitions in the event that they cannot create coalitions under their own leadership.

The term "focal point of security" that was put into political circulation at the beginning of the 1970s by the prominent American political scientist and political figure representing the school of so-called "political realism," Z. Brzezinski, for example, is a concentrated

expression of this policy.³ The search for "focal points of security" leads automatically, according to his plan, to a search for the best opportunities for the United States to dominate and limit the security interests of other states. It is typical that at the beginning of the 1980s Z. Brzezinski had already come out openly in favor of the creation of a "superbloc" under American leadership to oppose the USSR.

The typical approach of bourgeois history and political science to the problems of international security can be detected in theoretical and feature works today as well. The extensive anthologies called "World Politics. Structures—Motive Forces—Prospects" and "Asian-Pacific Security. Emerging Challenges and Responses,"⁴ coming out under the aegis of the West German Foreign Policy Society and the American Association of Researchers of International Relations respectively, can serve as examples of this. The authors of both anthologies proceed in their evaluations from the ever-growing significance of the region in the world political situation, which they consider first and foremost a strategic-military situation.

The Asian-Pacific region, feel Professor L. Grinter of the U.S. Air Force Command College and Professor W. Kihl of Iowa State University, is one of the most dynamically developing regions of the world. It bears the threat of conflicts in both military and the political senses, where the interests of the four major powers of the world intersect—the United States, the USSR, China and Japan. For the United States it is also the region of the greatest application of military potential in the course of the three major conflicts in which it has taken part—World War II, the Korean War and the war in Indochina. At the same time, this region is exceedingly important on the plane of world economics and trade. "The Asian-Pacific region could become the most powerful economic center in the world in the not-so-distant future."⁵

Both anthologies demonstrate typical features of the traditional political thinking characteristic of bourgeois diplomacy since the times of Machiavelli.

First of all, all questions of security are considered to be derivative of the correlation of military forces in the region. Second, a calculated concept of the need of the Asian states to oppose the "Soviet threat" are the implicit foundation of all of the postulates of the "balance of power." Third, the majority of the geopolitical constructs offered to describe the situation in the region and the prospects for its development proceed in this or that form from the desire and necessity of utilizing the infamous "China card" for anti-Soviet purposes. The intrinsic foreign-policy interests of the PRC—developing dynamically along the path of modernizing the socialist state—are either completely ignored or are falsely interpreted therein. Fourth, a manifestation of inter-imperialist contradictions between various components of the "balance of power" and the aspirations of each of the states to take the position of "focal point" or,

more precisely, "balancer" of the unsatisfactory military and political equation can be detected in the theoretical research and recommendations of the authors.

The majority of bourgeois authors consider the Asian-Pacific region to be one zone of confrontation in the "great clash" between the USSR and the United States. The chief axis of contradictions in the region, in the opinion of the editors and compilers of the "Asian-Pacific Security" anthology, for the foreseeable period will be the contradiction between the United States and its allies, on the one hand, and the USSR and its allies, on the other. The United States, China, Japan, the ASEAN countries and a group of states and formations in the region oppose the USSR, Vietnam and North Korea, write L. Grinter and W. Kihl, substituting wishful thinking for reality.⁶ Herein, supposes Z. Brzezinski, "one must proceed from one basic position: the American-Soviet rivalry is not some temporary delusion, but an historical confrontation that will continue for a long time. This confrontation is of a global nature, but it has clearly expressed geopolitical priorities, and for victory the United States should conduct it based on permanent and world strategic perspectives."⁷

This candidly neoglobalist concept of Z. Brzezinski corresponds to a certain extent to the evaluations and recommendations of some Japanese authors, especially Professor of International Relations M. Nishihara of the National Academy of the Self-Defense Forces. Describing the role of Japan in the Asian-Pacific region, M. Nishihara feels that the mission of convincing the other Asian governments that its "full" defensive potential (when it is achieved), as well as collaboration between Japan and the United States in the realm of defense within the framework of a security treaty, will provide "a reliable defensive shield" for the whole region has fallen to its lot. The author reserves an important place for ASEAN, upon which he would also like to place "defensive" functions. The role of Japan is reduced therein to ensuring the "front line of defense for ASEAN." An "adequately" armed Japan, M. Nishihara emphasizes, would signify a "gain" for South Korea and China.⁸

It is typical that M. Nishihara, like his colleague M. Sase at the National Academy of the Self-Defense Forces, in no way allows the possibility of reducing the level of militarization in the Asian-Pacific region. And this is at the same time as the USSR is proposing the implementation of a whole series of measures aimed at weakening tensions and reinforcing the security of all of the states in the region. I have in mind in particular the joint efforts to extinguish seats of tension, block paths of dissemination and growth in nuclear arms, devise steps for trust and guarantees of the non-application of force and to limit the activeness of navies and military presences overall in the basins of the Pacific and Indian oceans.

American specialists on Southeast Asia include first of all "the continuing growth of Soviet military potential" among the principal trends determining the formation of

the situation in the Asian-Pacific region within the framework of the geopolitical cliché of Z. Brzezinski set forth above. "The Russians," acknowledge W. Kihl and L. Grinter, "have every right to the role of great power in Asia and the Pacific. Three quarters of their territory and the major portion of its power and mineral resources are located in this region."⁹ Southeast Asia, however, they write, represents a region of instability to the Soviet Union from which a threat issues. As a result, Soviet policy in Asia is supposedly of an "imbalanced" nature. The military and force components, they say, predominate in it, and it is lacking in constructive political and economic proposals.¹⁰

In drawing a distorted picture of the situation in the region, the American authors naturally cannot but know that it is namely the United States that is the initiator of the arms race here. It is namely the United States that brought nuclear weapons into the region, its armed forces that were used for aggressive purposes in direct proximity to the USSR in Korea and it that unleashed large-scale aggression against the peoples of Indochina in the 1960s and 1970s. Even today they are the suppliers of arms to a regime that represents no one on territory that is legally Chinese—the island of Taiwan. Ignoring facts that testify to the neoglobalist aspirations of the United States in the Asian-Pacific region is essential for the conservative American political scientists to substantiate the second "long-term trend" that, in their opinion, defines the long-term prospects of the situation, and namely the "slow compensation" of the military "imbalance" in Southeast Asia by the United States. Rejecting the policy of "departure beyond the horizon" that was conducted under the Carter administration, the Reagan administration has halted the reduction in U.S. military presence in the Asian-Pacific region and, on the contrary, has set about the consistent modernization and increase of the armed forces of the United States and its allies here. Despite the facts, however, L. Grinter and W. Kihl assert that changes in the policies of the United States are not leading to the restoration of U.S. military superiority, since the Russians, they say, "are exceedingly dynamically increasing their own military presence in the Asian-Pacific region."¹¹

The increasing military presence of the United States in the region is necessary in order to undertake another adventure of the type of the inglorious war in Indochina. The future, declare L. Grinter and W. Kihl, requires the "multi-layering" of the burden "to maintain the status quo in the Asian-Pacific region."

The future of the region, in their opinion, is connected with the effect of such a factor as the significance of Southeast Asia as one of the regions of the most dynamic trade and investment activity in the world. This factor makes possible the formation of their own military potentials by the countries in the region without "superstraining" their resources. "Naturally," it is noted, for example, in the book being considered, "Japan, the

richest country in the region, could double or even triple its spending for military needs without any negative consequences for its economy whatsoever."¹²

"Keeping in mind the growth rate of the gross national product in the countries of Southeast Asia (an average of 6 to 9 percent) in recent years, it can be assumed," write L. Grinter and J. Kihl in this regard, "that their ability to pay for arms is also increasing."¹³ Whence the authors conclude that a "re-orientation" in the distribution of the burden "of maintaining security" in Southeast Asia is essential, although, they acknowledge, many Asian states, for reasons "of a political sort," are inclined to preserve the dependence on the United States in maintaining their security.

The authors thus speak out in favor of the following plan of action: The United States, while constantly increasing its own strategic forces, guarantees the status quo from the "Soviet military threat." Japan, South Korea and ASEAN (L. Grinter and W. Kihl persistently advise them to form a military alliance) would do "the dirty work" of immediately repulsing the "Soviet threat" on the spot. And all of the "dynamically developing" Southeast Asian countries spend the accumulations they are forming for the procurement of American arms.

Naturally, Z. Brzezinski, the West Germans and the Japanese authors cannot cite a single bit of proof of "Soviet aggression." L. Grinter and W. Kihl, it is true, write about some supposedly great danger to stability in the region represented by the "undermining activity" of the Soviet embassy in the Philippines.¹⁴ But even they cannot explain why the American naval and air-force bases at Subic Bay and Clark, the might of the whole U.S. Seventh Fleet and the nuclear-armed aircraft based at Misawa are proving inadequate to neutralize the "undermining activity."

The matter, of course, consists not of a "Soviet threat," but rather of the fact that the peoples and governments of the Asian-Pacific region want to determine their path of development themselves without dictate from across the ocean. And even the American geostrategists acknowledge this when they write about "multi-layering" the personnel of the bases at Subic Bay and Clark by including military contingents of the ASEAN countries in them. L. Grinter and J. Kihl write of the anti-American sentiment in the Philippines,¹⁵ a sentiment that has determined the political climate in the country since the United States, under the pretext of assisting the Philippine revolution, turned this country into a colony. The anti-American sentiment arose as early as the beginning of the century, and thus it is absurd to consider the source of it to be the activity of the Soviet embassy in the Philippines. In ascribing expansionist aspirations alien to the very nature of the socialist social order to the USSR, seemingly sound bourgeois researchers tumble into the positions of primitive anticommunist propaganda. They glorify the capitalist mode of production therein as the sole one able to bring the Asian countries

to prosperity. Professor D. Oberndorfer of Freiburg University (West Germany) thus explains the economic achievements of some Asian states (South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, as well as Taiwan and Hong Kong) by the fact that their socio-cultural traditions fostered the adoption of "Western methods of production."¹⁶ At the same time, the major successes of Vietnam, North Korea, China and Mongolia, achieved under immeasurably more difficult historical conditions than those of any country of ASEAN, are unmentioned or are explained by the import of Western technology (China).

Assistance in forming an "unofficial strategic triad" in the region aimed against the USSR—in which the author would like to include the United States, Japan and China, organizing close economic and political collaboration among them—is included by Z. Brzezinski as one of "four broad geopolitical priorities" of the United States in the international arena.¹⁷ Such an alliance would pale in significance to the relations of the United States with the Western European NATO allies, but it would be, in Brzezinski's opinion, more important than reinforcing U.S. positions in the "soft underbelly" of southwestern Asia and supporting anti-socialist elements in the Warsaw Pact countries.

The lack of realism in such geopolitical postulations is even noted by American authors themselves. In a book that came out in the United States edited by Professor J. Hsiung, official Washington is subjected to criticism for its inability to be oriented toward and give a correct treatment to its mutual relations with Peking.¹⁸ If the United States does not restructure its approach both in international relations overall and toward China in particular, feel the authors representing the prestigious Institute of Contemporary Asian Research, it can ultimately prove to be in dangerous isolation. The situation is becoming even more dangerous, since the PRC will gradually be transformed into a powerful state with ever growing potential (into a "superpower," as J. Hsiung writes). The hopes of the American ruling circles for the disintegration of the political and ideological system of the PRC, the researchers feel, are "simply ludicrous against a background of the domestic political measures being undertaken by China."¹⁹

In summarizing the evaluations and forecasts concerning U.S. policy in relation to the PRC, R. Satter, a specialist on Asian affairs for the U.S. Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, notes that American foreign-policy advisers proceed from a supposedly noted tendency to diminish the strategic significance of China as an "ally" of the United States. China, R. Satter feels, could hardly collaborate with the United States against the Soviet Union; it is concentrating its attention on the practical tasks of economic modernization and internal development. At the same time, the "excessive" demands of China regarding Taiwan are preserved. The increase and qualitative improvement of the United

States would reduce their dependence on political alliance with Peking. The value of such an alliance is diminished, since "other allies"—the Western European member countries of NATO and Japan—are displaying a readiness to collaborate with Washington "as never before." Japan and the ASEAN countries are more important for the United States, since they provide strategic access to the regions of Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.²⁰

The evaluations by R. Satter are permeated throughout with the geostrategic principles of the American school of "political realism." This is testified to, for example, by the definition of the positions of the PRC on the question of Taiwan as "excessive pretensions." R. Satter has nonetheless succeeded, albeit from incorrect methodological positions, in reflecting the real political processes transpiring in the Asian-Pacific region overall and in American-Chinese relations in particular.

A group of researchers united around the foreign-policy staff of the Democratic Party, as opposed to the overt anti-Soviet postulates of the "balance of power" in the region in the spirit of the "geostrategic priority" of Z. Brzezinski, is proposing "a shift of American policy in relation to China onto a fundamentally new track." The point of departure for this policy should be connected with harmonious interaction in the "Moscow-Washington-Peking triad." This assumes the rejection of efforts to play the "China card." The establishment of more sensible relations with the USSR is proposed as a first step toward the new policy (first of all on issues of limiting the arms race). As a result, these political scientists feel, the United States will take a more favorable position in the "triad" in view of its considerable "technological supremacy, while the USSR and the PRC will, in their opinion, strive to expand their ties with America for that reason."²¹

This scheme for the development of relations among the USSR, China and the United States is doubtless more realistic than betting on isolating the USSR from collaborating with the countries in the Asian-Pacific region, although a utopian goal of achieving political and economic hegemony by the United States in the region can still be discerned.

The aforementioned idea of Z. Brzezinski regarding the creation of an "unofficial strategic triad" aiming its point at the USSR is finding understanding among a certain portion of Japanese researchers, and in particular Professor M. Sase of the National Academy of the Self-Defense Forces. M. Sase, like his colleague M. Nishihara, recognizes that business people in Japan are placing great hopes on expanding economic collaboration with the Soviet Union. But M. Sase asserts that the possibility for constructive dialogue between the USSR and Japan is being blocked by the notorious problem of the "northern territories," declaring furthermore that there are no proposals from the Soviet side, he says, for

profitable large-scale projects and that the USSR supposedly offers no goods that Japan could import. Passing off wishful thinking for reality, he writes that Japanese business circles have supposedly already "reconciled themselves" to the impossibility of re-animating Japanese-Soviet economic ties in the near future.²²

After the late American political scientist G. Kahn, M. Sase and M. Nishihara feel that the coming center of world economics and trade will shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Reflecting the views of militarist circles in Tokyo, they are striving to put the USSR outside the bounds of the emerging "Pacific community."²³ They are ignoring most important world economic factors therein, including the circumstance that Soviet participation in the "Pacific economic community" would be facilitated to a considerable extent by accelerating the realization of the expectations associated with it. Coming out against such participation Sase and M. Nishihara are not thinking so much in economic terms as in geopolitical ones.

The policy of excommunicating the USSR from economic collaboration in the region earns the praise of Z. Brzezinski. At the same time, he speaks of the necessity of "displaying extreme caution in evaluating the rate and scale of increase of Japanese military might," feeling that "Japan could make a very significant contribution to ensuring international security not via an increase in arms, but by allocating more funds to the economic development of Pakistan, Egypt and Central America."²⁴

Whereas the American authors display a certain caution in relation to Japanese militarism, West German bourgeois political scientists will accept any disposition of forces in the "United States-Japan-China triad" as long as it is directed against the USSR. The most important thing for them, as the leader of a working group on "Sinocommunism" at the Federal Institute for Research in Oriental Studies and International Relations, D. Heinzig, writes is "to use market competition offered by the United States and the political West (the author includes Japan in the concept of the 'political West'—V.P.) in the strategic triad to oppose the Soviet Union with the necessary caution and at the same time as effectively as possible."²⁵

The direction of geopolitical and geostrategic research touched on by D. Heinzig is continued by an academic associate of the West German Institute of International Politics and Security (Ebenhausen), J. Glaubitz. He touches on the genesis and prospects for solving the Taiwan problem, Chinese-Japanese differences due to the ownership of islands in the East China Sea and conflicts in Southeast and Northeast Asia, as well as in the South China Sea. He considers separately the problem of the "northern territories" in relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, as well as the confrontation on the Korean peninsula.

In his approach to the cited problems, as well as the issue of Asian security overall, J. Glaubitz strives quite obviously to oppose the USSR to the other countries of the Asian-Pacific region, and detente in Europe to that in Asia.

Ignoring the circumstance that the presence of serious seats of tension has been brought about by U.S. policies and their actual occupation of South Korea and Taiwan, the West German political scientist asserts that a process of detente has occurred in eastern Asia simultaneously with the analogous process in Europe, relations between China and the United States and Japan and the ASEAN countries have begun to improve and common interests have begun to move to the forefront. The chief honor for this (as for the appearance of detente in Europe) belongs herein to the United States, and not to the Soviet Union, whose adherence to detente is supposedly limited Europe and who supposedly has a critical attitude toward detente in eastern Asia, since it is, he says, against its interests.

In perverting the actual state of affairs, this interpretation of the issue of security in the Asian-Pacific region is needed by J. Glaubitz to substantiate the assertions that the Soviet Union has no serious political influence in eastern and northeastern Asia. "China, Japan and the United States," he writes, "are the dominant states here, and their interests coincide at least in keeping the Soviet Union far from the region."²⁶

The geopolitical machinations lying at the heart of these conceptions of the West German authors are obvious—they reflect the positions of the ruling circles of West Germany. "Conflict between Moscow and Peking..." wrote, in particular, Bundestag CDU-CSU Working Committee on Foreign-Policy Issues Chairman E. Majonea, "improves Western and, along with them, German positions. It binds the Soviet Union and limits its freedom to conduct negotiations."²⁷ The ignoring of the active role and independent foreign-policy interests of the PRC is typical of West German "geopolitical scientists" both in 1965 and in our day—it was and is figured in their postulations to be just the notorious "China card." And the discussion, moreover, concerns a great socialist state playing a large role in the fate of the world and the security and development of the Asian-Pacific region, a state to relations with which the Soviet Union imparts exceptionally great significance. "History has given the Soviet and Chinese peoples an extremely crucial mission," emphasized M.S. Gorbachev, "and much in international development depends on the two largest socialist states."²⁸

Bourgeois political scientists are striving to put into the Procrusteanbed of "limited detente" such positive facts of mutual relations that determine much between the USSR and China as regular meetings of the heads of states of governments, political consultations at the level of special government representatives of the rank of deputy minister of foreign affairs and the exchange of

delegations from supreme legislative organs that have taken place for the first time after a more than 20-year interruption. The progress achieved in setting up contacts between the leading political figures of both countries is also treated as "limited detente" by bourgeois authors.

The commonality or similarity of the positions of the USSR and the PRC on a whole series of topical international problems also goes beyond the bounds of "limited detente." Both socialist nuclear states have unilaterally adopted a resolution on no first use of nuclear weapons. The positions of the USSR and China are also close or coincide on such issues as the complete and universal banning of nuclear-weapons testing, the inadmissibility of militarizing outer space and the situation in the Near East, southern Africa and Central America.

The USSR has a regard for the the role of the PRC as a great power conducting separate and independent policies, respects its legal interests and supports its positions, for example, on the issue of Taiwan as an indivisible part of China. In the opinion of the Soviet side, which has been repeatedly expressed at the summit level, such objective factors as the similarity of the socio-economic order, geographical proximity, coincidence of tasks being resolved aimed at accelerating socio-economic progress and the needs of the national economies of the two countries can and should foster the further development of Sino-Soviet relations on the basis of a strict observance of the principles of mutual advantage and respect for sovereignty. The process of normalization of Sino-Soviet relations is not transpiring, as opposed to all sorts of geopolitical constructs of in the spirit of the notorious "United States-China-Japan triad," as has been repeatedly declared, at the expense of third countries herein.

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The geopolitical constructs of bourgeois political scientists regarding the situation in the Asian-Pacific region prove to be unable to show a way out of the extremely acute contradictions being manifested in the region between the various centers of power in the capitalist world.

For the United States, as becomes clear from the aforementioned statements of Z. Brzezinski, the large-scale militarization of Japan, in which a certain portion of its ruling circles are displaying a vested interest, is unacceptable. At the same time, the Western European partners of the United States in NATO would prefer that Japan increase its military spending and weaken its "economic press" on the world market. B. Junemann, editor of the West German daily *Wirtschaftswoche*, is troubled by the "Pacific challenge" to Western Europe, affirming the well-known theory of American political scientist G. Kahn on the gradual displacement of the center of gravity in world politics and economics from the Atlantic to the Pacific. As early as 1977, writes B.

Junemann with alarm, the countries of the region had knocked Western Europe out of the place of chief trading partner with the United States. Whereas the United States has a current trade surplus in trade with Western Europe, the deficit has reached a record level in trade with the countries of the Asian-Pacific region—some 34 billion dollars. The chief component of the "Asian economic miracle," writes Junemann, is the progress of Japan. Right behind Japan follow the "four little dragons"—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Quite recently, grieves the West German economist, they were included among the developing states, and now they have turned into "young industrial countries." Hong Kong and Singapore have entered among the most important financial centers of the world. The export volume of the "four dragons" is four times that of all of the countries of Latin America etc. The rate of socio-economic development of the non-island ASEAN member countries is also considerable.

The rapid economic development of the countries in the Asian-Pacific region, Junemann feels, should be no cause for alarm in Western Europe. At the same time, he calls upon Western European businessmen to "learn from their competitors," first and foremost the Japanese, without waiving thereby the "values of European capitalist civilization."²⁹

As far military issues, the practical recommendations of Western authors to their governments in this connection are quite decisive and categorical. Here, for example, is how the authors of the anthology "Asian-Pacific Security" propose the government of the United States act in the region:

—the United States should affirm its obligations and its determination to render assistance in the defense of the region, thereby ensuring security for continuing economic growth and political stability;

—it should continue efforts to "multi-layer" the defense of the Sea of Japan zone and its three main straits, striving thereby toward convergence with Japan and South Korea in implementing military planning and conducting military operations in the region;

—it should strive to transform ASEAN into a military grouping that puts pressure on Vietnam;

—it is important to support the "selective arming" of China against the USSR with a guarantee that China will not use the weapons obtained against any other country than the USSR;

—the zone of naval maneuvers conducted by the United States and its allies in the Asian-Pacific region under the code name of RIMPAC should be expanded; the forces of ANZUS and Japanese observers, as well as the countries of ASEAN and South Korea, should be included in this sphere along with Canada.

—the United States should foster a liberalization of trade in the region between the Asian-Pacific countries based on the principles of the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]; markets should be opened for countries that follow the corresponding economic and political lines.³⁰

These recommendations contain no attempts to find a way to untie the truly complex interweavings of political interests in the region, reduce the level of military confrontation and limit the activeness of land and naval forces or any concern for the development of economic, scientific, technical and cultural collaboration among the countries of the region.

In the face of all of the outward distinctions in the concepts of the bourgeois geopolitical scientists that have been considered, a common trait of them is ignoring the interests of the states and peoples of the Asian-Pacific region themselves and their active role in the world political process. The term "peaceful co-existence," adopted in the research on the topic of European security, is not used by the bourgeois authors in relation to Asia at all. Peaceful initiatives of the socialist countries are either not mentioned or are distorted. The initiatives of, for example, the three fraternal countries of Indochina, the Korean Peoples Democratic Republic and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan aimed at reducing tensions and settling situations in certain regions of the continent, moreover have great significance for reinforcing peace and stability in the Asian-Pacific region. Under conditions of a growing nuclear threat, the initiatives of North Korea, the countries of Southeast Asia and the southern part of the Pacific Ocean on creating a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula, in Southeast Asia and in Oceania and China's joining of the Rarotonga Treaty are deserving of particular attention. The socialist countries of the region are in favor of the strict observance of the three non-nuclear principles by the non-nuclear states of Asia and the Pacific: "do not produce, do not acquire and do not deploy nuclear weapons on one's territory."

Under today's complex conditions on the continent, the socialist countries feel it is essential to put into widespread practice in international relations the principles of peaceful co-existence, especially the principles of the "Pancha Shila" and the ten principles adopted in 1955 at the conference of Asian and African states in Bandung. They are deeply convinced that the way to reinforce peace and stability and the development of good-neighbor relations and equal and mutually beneficial collaboration among the countries of the continent lies through the arrangement of contacts and dialogue and the holding of meetings and consultations at various levels along with a unification of effort and joint actions by all forces of good will regardless of political convictions, social status and other differences. The socialist countries are ready to welcome all positive proposals aimed at organizing bilateral and multilateral meetings to consider unsettled issues, reinforce trust and achieve common consent and mutual understanding on the most varied of policies. They feel

that the possibility of achieving agreement on the convocation of a broad representative Asia-wide forum similar to the Bandung Conference is real and that it could discuss problems troubling the Asian countries in comprehensive fashion.

The Soviet program of nuclear disarmament and the creation of an all-encompassing system of international security has especial significance in this regard. The realization of this program is vitally essential today for all regions of the world, including Asia. As was emphasized, for example, by the first deputy minister of foreign affairs of Mongolia, D. Yendon, the proposals advanced in the speech of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev in Vladivostok "envisage reliable and real ways for re-animating the political climate in the region and reinforcing trust and collaboration among the Asian countries."³¹

* * *

The objective necessity of creating a mechanism that would ensure the preservation of peace, security and collaboration in the Asian-Pacific region is no less—and in a number of concrete aspects is even more—palpable than in other regions. "The Soviet Union," emphasizes M.S. Gorbachev, "does not divide principles of international politics into European and Asian, and proceeds from the fact that in today's mutually dependent world, the peoples of all continents live with common hopes and fears. We are in favor of peace and good-neighbor relations, trust, mutual understanding and mutual benefit from the exchange of technology, goods and cultural values holding sway in relations among states in the Asian-Pacific region, which is taking on ever greater significance in international life."³²

A constructive approach to the vital problems of the Asian-Pacific region free of any preconceptions is essential in our time. Their resolution, based on principles of justice, will inflict no harm to anyone's national interests. The people of the whole world will gain from it.

Footnotes

1. Foreign Policy Documents of the USSR. Vol. 18. Moscow, 1973, p 234.

2. For an academic analysis of Soviet concepts of security and disarmament see, for example: V.F. Petrovskiy. "Sovetskaya kontseptsiya bezopasnosti" [The Soviet Concept of Security]. Moscow, 1986.

3. Z. Brzezinski. US Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus.—*Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 51. N.Y., 1973, No 4, pp 708-728.

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12821

First Test of U.S. 'Alpha' Laser Noted

[Editorial Report] 18010097a Moscow PRAVDA in Russian published in Russian on 6 January 1988 on page 1 a 400-word article by PRAVDA's U.S. correspondent

in New York, V. Linnik, entitled: "Correspondent Comments: Concerning 'Alpha' and Trust". The article notes that the U.S. Air Force conducted the first of four intended tests of the SDI-related 'Alpha' chemical laser in California. The laser is asserted to have a power of 2 million watts at present, and may easily be increased to 5-10 million watts. It is said to be capable of destroying any current or planned missile. However, American academics opposed to "Star Wars" are said to believe that the system is too low-powered to successfully carry out any mission. Therefore, Linnik concludes that its only purpose is to disrupt the ABM treaty.

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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SPD Chairman Vogel's Washington Talks Viewed
DW271155 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 26 Mar 88 p 2

[Editorial by "MES": "The SPD's Importance"]

[Text] Hans-Jochen Vogel has never had to complain about not being received politely or properly in Washington, not even 4 years ago when the positions of the German Social Democrats and the U.S. Administration on the disarmament issue were totally different. Now the SPD chief states that he was received in a very friendly way during his recent visit and was under the impression that the SPD is now able to cooperate with the big ally more constructively and more intensely. The reason for that is probably the changed international climate rather than a renaissance of relations between the Reagan people and the Bonn opposition.

The chilly distance marking those relations at the critical point of the controversial counterarmament [Nachruestung] decision seems to have given way to normalcy. However, we should not fail to see that the Washington establishment—Republicans and Democrats—are a long way from considering Vogel the future German Federal chancellor. But Vice President Bush views the SPD chairman as a moderate politician of the center. That means a lot, in view of the good chances he has to succeed Ronald Reagan as the next U.S. President.

However, the SPD's political analysts should not overassess that. It is not difficult to agree on solved problems. The next conflict over disarmament policy issues is already in sight. The SPD and the U.S. Administration differ clearly on the modernization of short-range missiles and on the problem of missiles with even shorter ranges. In that respect, the question as to how much the SPD will in the future influence the alliance's decisions, will very much depend on the degree to which the government and the opposition will be able to reconcile their positions.

SPD's Vogel Wants FRG Position on Lance Missile Replacement Defined

DW290808 Hamburg ARD Television Network in German 1800 GMT 28 Mar 88

[Text] According to SPD Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel, in connection with nuclear short-range missiles in Europe, the U.S. Government is determined to replace the Lance missile with a new system. The new system will have a range of some 450km. Following a trip to the United States, Vogel stated in Bonn today that U.S. Government officials had told him frankly that the decisions on missile modernization would be made in 1989. For that reason the FRG Government should define its position on the matter as soon as possible, Vogel said. FRG Chancellor Kohl's statement, according to which modernization will not be a subject for the foreseeable future, is not in line with the facts, Vogel added.

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DATE FILMED

28 April 1988